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Review of Strategic Management Models and
Frameworks
Mohammadsaleh Saadatmand , Maoloud Dabab, Charles Weber
Dept. of Engineering and Technology Management, Portland State University, Portland, OR - USA
Abstract—This research reviews a comprehensive and
somehow chronological literature in the models and frameworks
of competition and strategy. Strategic management research is
shaped around a core question that why some firms outperform
others; several significant lines of work have emerged in the
strategic management field since its infancy. These include
industrial organization, the resource-based view and dynamic
capabilities. Also, Competition essentially has been the focal point
of scholars with diverse perspectives such as industrial economics
and structural analysis, strategic groups, game theory, and
competitive dynamics. In this research, we represent and
summarize different perspectives of scholars in framing
competition and strategy that is related to theory of the firm and
differential firm performance; also, we show that there is a trend
from static to dynamic frameworks of strategy and competition
which have tried to find an answer to differential firm
performance. Finally, we conclude by addressing the potential for
utilizing new dynamic and systemic perspectives regarding
theorizing dynamics of strategy and competition.

I. INTRODUCTION
The question “why do some companies exhibit persistent
superior performance over others” for a long time has been of
great importance to scholars and practitioners in the business.
Hence, the field of strategic management is organized around
this central question. ‘This question does not assume that there
will always be persistent performance differences between
firms.’ Rather, it supposedly assumes that in some situations
persistent performance differences will arise between firms and
those differences cannot be explained by traditional economic
models of the firm. According to these traditional models, these
differences should be unusual and if they exist, are most likely
the result of anti-competitive collusive or monopolistic
activities. [1] Also, ‘although economic theory predicts that
differences among rival firms will be eliminated over time by
competition, empirical evidence in strategic management
research has shown this is not to be the case’.[2] So, some
frameworks and models from different views have been
proposed over time by researchers for describing competition
and such performance differences.
First models of competition based on the industrial
organization (IO) economics were neo-classic models in a
range from monopoly to perfect competition. Rooted in
industrial organization (IO) economics and based on MasonBain approach, structure-conduct-performance (SCP) was
proposed. SCP model states that a highly concentrated market

structure, dominated by a few large firms, will give rise to little
rivalry and excessive prices and profits. On the other hand, a
structure consisting of many small firms will produce a high
degree of rivalry and low prices and profits. The S-C-P model
focuses on factors driving the intensity of rivalry; as such, this
perspective has been very useful in understanding competition
and competitive strategy.
The IO perspective and research tradition provide direct
insights to how firms can obtain competitive advantage (in
terms of IO, market power) through positioning in the industry
structure and therefore pursuing strategies appropriate to that
structure. However, the IO literature has limitations in
producing a comprehensive theory of competitive advantage
and differential firm performance. That theory is in the form of
a mathematical model with an equilibrium solution which is an
important constraint. Also, the IO literature focused on the
industry as a unit of analysis and has suffered from a lack of
attention to internal organizational factors and a general failure
to measure conduct directly in empirical studies.
Whereas IO studies of the relationships between industry
structure, conduct, and performance were intended to help
develop public policies that promote competition, Michael
Porter by taking a different point of reference pioneered the
application of IO concepts to strategy formulation [1, 2]. More
specifically, he viewed the SCP paradigm as giving managers a
systematic model for assessing competition and developing
profit-maximizing strategies. So he proposed a well-known
Five – Forces model for finding attractive industries and the
ways of positioning in those industries for gaining superior
performance. Indeed, he tried to answer two questions: where
to compete? and how to compete? By disaggregating businessunit profits into components capturing industry effects,
corporate effects and market share effects, Porter following [3]
contend the importance of industry effects on firm
performance. But, by extending Schmalensee ‘s approach, [4,
5, 6] reveal that business effects were twice as important for
company performance as effects of industry. These results
stimulated research interest in the slightly refined question:
“Why do firms in the same industry perform differently?” In
answer, this question, several frameworks, and theories have
been proposed. One problem with Porter’s model and IO
economics, in general, is that it tends to view industries as in
equilibrium and competitive advantage as sustainable.
However, in today’s fast-paced world, resting on the
achievements of yesterday’s actions, even if they were
successful, surely result in failure tomorrow. Today’s
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competition needs dynamic actions, with perpetual updating
and reevaluation of situation and strategy.
From an internal point of view, the dominant framework in
the strategy literature to address the question has been
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. ‘According to RBV,
‘firms in the same industry perform differently because, even in
equilibrium, firms differ in terms of resources and capabilities
they control’ [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] These frameworks have one
feature in common that is not suitable for fast-changing
environment of today; they are all static and linear in nature.
Hence, scholars started to propose more dynamic models and
frameworks for strategy, competition, and subsequent
differential firm performance. Strategy scholars have started to
acknowledge explicitly the importance of dynamic processes,
including the acquisition, development, and maintenance of
differential bundles of resources and capabilities over time [9,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. This perspective called dynamics
capabilities is an extension of the RBV of the firm. One of the
criticisms of the traditional resource-based view is that it
largely ignores the external environment. Dynamic capabilities
attempt to resolve this shortcoming: Teece [19] define
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build,
and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address
rapidly changing environments.” This definition brings into
play both the resource-based view and the notion of rapidly
changing environments.
Simultaneously, competitive dynamics that its root goes
back to Austrian economics is another research stream which
considered competition to be a dynamic market process rather
than a static market condition. The concentration is on the
process according which a market has moves toward or back
from equilibrium; it is this movement and not the equilibrium ,
that was taken to be of interest. Competitive dynamics is the
research area of interfirm competition according to special
micro competitive acts and reactions, tactical and based on
organizational contexts, and their forces and results. companies
act and competitors have reactions, and these back and force
determine existence and long-term performance. In contrast to
Porter’s approach that unit of analysis is industry level, this
stream of research has focused on micro and real competitive
actions and reactions among competing firms.
One more dynamic approach to dynamic competition has
been evolutionary economics. Nelson and Winter [20] studied
strategy, performance, and survival of companies over time
using a variant of Darwin’s natural selection theory. In the
short-term, firms may pursue targets rather than profit
maximization, such as ‘‘satisficing’’ or striving for profits to be
achieved above some acceptable level. However, any firm
veering too far will be weeded out of the marketplace
eventually. Firms are cognizant of this harsh natural selection
process and tend to learn over time how better to adapt.
These streams of strategy research show that strategy
scholars are interested in dynamic theories that depict the
dynamic evolution of performance differences
among
companies. making and experimenting theories that
describe longitudinal performance differences patterns among
companies would be an enormous step forward where
mainstream strategy approaches have struggled. As Porter

stated below: “while there has been considerable progress in
developing frameworks that explain differing competitive
success at any given point in time, our understanding of
the dynamic processes by which firms perceive and
ultimately attain superior market positions is far less
developed” [21]. Ghemawat and Cassiman have pointed to the
same problem as well. “The challenge of fully incorporating
dynamics into how we think about strategy is a major one,
perhaps the biggest one that the field faces going forward”
[22].
In this research, by doing a literature review, we intend to
show that models of competition in answering differential
company performance in the field of strategic management
have moved from static to more dynamic. From early days of
research, strategic management has been a multidisciplinary
field which has been borrowing heavily from economics,
psychology, sociology, political science, evolutionary biology,
systems science. But the main contribution originated from
economics. In this paper, economics approaches as the main
contributor are adopted as well. We would find how each
individual study has examined competition and strategy. Also,
we would represent what are commonalities in existing
studies, what studies disagree about. We state that, because of
the social and multidisciplinary nature of strategy, it is
neccessary for scholars to adopt several perspectives
described by different theories for the progression of this field.
II. THE HISTORICAL OF SCHOLAR THOUGHT
A. Two classic competition models: Cournot and Bertrand
In 1838, Cournot proposed a model for competitive
industries in which firms make decisions by acting rationally,
trying to maximize profits, and strategically, taking into
account its competitors’ decisions at the time of making their
own. In such model, economists assume that Industries are
such that, due to entry barriers, there is little scope for new
entrants to undermine the competitive structure of the industry.
Therefore, by setting their output to maximize profits, the
market will determine prices higher than the perfectly
competitive equilibrium price, and under this condition firms
will benefit in a sustained manner. Fifty years later Joseph
Bertrand reviewed Cournot’s work and proposed an
extension to Cournot’s model where, instead of firms setting
the quantities, they adjust the price of the goods produced.
Bertrand pointed out that there was a shortcoming in Cournot’s
argument: even though the solution holds in equilibrium, if one
of the producers were to reduce their price by an infinitesimal
amount, that producer would attract all buyers, which would
then mean that the competitor would have to reduce their price
to below the competitor’s price, and so on leading to a ‘price
spiral’ until the firms would be charging the cost of production.
It is interesting that even though the Bertrand and Cournot
competition models have very similar assumptions, they
produce vastly different outcomes: in the Cournot model, firms
make profits, whereas, in the Bertrand model, firms do not.
B. Industrial organization (IO) perspective
The traditional industrial organization paradigm is one of
the foundations in strategic thinking and research. Let’s take a

look at earliest strategy frameworks and find their connections
with IO. One of the earliest proposed frameworks in
strategy field is Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth
(LCAG) framework that has become the foundation of business
policy [36]. This framework defined strategy as a means of
how a firm attempts to compete in its environment with
considering important choices of different internal and external
aspects of the business. It also took into account macro factors
such political and social factors. Indeed LCAG suggested
general and logical tests in determining firm’s policies. In this
framework, the successful firm was one that created and found
a position in its industry which took into account internal and
external factors. Since early business strategy literature after to
LCAG was extensively translated fundamental paradigms of
LCAG and extensions into a sequence of general analytical
steps [37].

concentration, entry barriers and so on). The main unanswered
question in IO (Bain/Mason) perspective was “what are paths
to such structure and what strategist can do about changes in
this structure?” Moreover, traditional IO considered industry
structure the sole determinant of firms conduct and
performance. Thus firms are under the shadow of their
industrial structures, and there is no room for change and
innovation. But practical strategists, on the other hand, have
realized that firms can change the structure of their industries
through their actions. It was evident in the real world that there
are often game changers that change the rules of industries.
Furthermore, oligopoly theories were abstract, and most of the
concepts were based on abstract experimental situations and
not actual industries. All in all, these shortcomings made
business strategists uncomfortable about embracing IO.

The essence of IO and subsequently proposed frameworks
based on this paradigm (e.g., Bain/Mason) is that a
company’s performance in the market depends on the
structural characteristics of the industry condition in which it
has competition. It means that industry structure determines the
behavior/conduct (strategy) of firms and the collective conduct
then determine the collective performance of the firms in the
industry [38]. In this view, firms have dimensions such as
allocation efficiency, technical efficiency, and innovativeness.
Since the structure is the prior cause of conduct and conduct
itself is the cause of performance, in this chain conduct could
be neglected and consider industry structure directly in trying
to explain performance.

C. Theories of the firm
Economic thought has had a deep influence on thinking in
the field of strategy. In particular, theories of the firm bring a
viewpoint for thinking about organizational objectives and a
framework for analyzing important firm and competition
research problems. The main question regarding firms in the
theory of the firm is that if markets are the effective forms of
exchange “why firms exist?” and also “what are their
boundaries and scope?” Here, we demonstrate the
assumptions underlying of several economic theories of the
firm for tracing the background in competition and strategy
research.

An essential branch of IO research is oligopoly theory; it’s
the study of the consequence of competitive interactions in a
market where firm’s actions affect its competitors [39]. This
theory wanted to make clear the link between structure and
inter-firm rivalry and provide difficulty determinants firms
were facing in the market competition. It filled the gap of
bipolar cases of pure competition and monopoly in the
economist’s view. Also, one influential framework for the
analysis of competitive interactions was born, “game theory”
[40, 41]. Game theory found its place in IO as a section of
oligopoly theory. Although these theories were so important in
the strategic research and suggested systematic frameworks
for assessing competition in an industry, they essentially
attempt to focus on just one aspect of LCAG framework:
external factors (opportunities and threats).
IO economic paradigm has had the highest impact in
forming foundations of strategic thinking and research, but
strategy practitioners have been skeptical of IO. Porter [42]
outlines some of the most important ones: Frames of reference
are different between practitioners and IO perspective; former
is interested in the issues of an individual and unique
company, latter focus on industry as a unit of analysis.
Some research also explained that even in an industry firm
perform differently. IO assumption was that all firms in an
industry are identical. Hence, IO was not able to bring an
answer for differential firm performance in the same industry.
In addition, IO perspective was static. Although the static
model is useful in the analysis of competition, most
fundamental strategic issues for firms in the competition are
not solely structure but structural changes (such as dynamics of

C.1 Neo-classical perfect competition
In this view firm exist to combine resources to produce a
product; Firm is assumed like a black box with some inputs
which its output is a joint product of multiple inputs. In this
neo-classical model, two main inputs are labor and capital.
Perfect competition generally assumes that optimum input can
be confirmed, all parties in the competition have complete
information and resources are completely mobile and divisible.
In this model since firms assumed to be identical, the objective
of each individual firm in maximizing profit yields the whole
market to equilibrium and thus zero economic returns for each
firm.
C.2 Chicago tradition
The implicit theory of the firm in this tradition is that firms
exist to enhance efficiency in production and distribution. From
the theory of the firm’s point of view in Chicago approach,
when firms act together as a monopolist in the industry, their
combined profits are maximized. However, Stigler [26] figures
out that effective collusion requires costly control and
enforcement, given that each party has an incentive to
chisel on the agreement. Because of these high costs, Chicago
school of thought holds that effective collusion is not likely to
persist. So observed large size and above-normal returns are
due to the firm’s efficiency differential in production and
distribution in comparison to competitors. Chicago perspective
applies main concepts of neo-classical price theory – in
particular profit maximizing and competition – while
neglecting other central assumptions of perfect competition.
One paramount role in this perspective is the entry of new

competitors in imposing an imperative efficiency on incumbent
firms and on determining long-run earnings potential. Although
this view holds the efficiency based profits “need not be
eliminated soon by competition” [27], in the long-term
imitative entry will drive the firm’s profits to zero.
C.3 Coase/Williamson transaction cost theory
Ronald Coase was the pioneer in this view who notes firms
and market are alternative methods for coordinating
production. Hence, the question to be answered in realizing the
existence of firms is the basis for choosing between
alternatives. The core of Coase’s [28] analysis is that
operation of market bring some cost, and by creating an
organization
and
permitting
some
authority
(an
entrepreneur) to direct the resources, certain costs are
preserved. In this view what is particularly important is the cost
of negotiating contracts for inputs. Thus, firms exist to
economize on the costs of conducting the same exchange
between contractors.
One framework in this approach called “market failures”
framework [29] which is based on Coase’s work, challenges
the traditional assumptions of the theory of the firm. From this
perspective, the form of organization that develops in an
exchange situation depends on the efficiency of that form for
completing necessary transactions. This framework assumes
decision-makers are opportunistic with bounded rationality.
The fundamental characteristics of transactions between firms
and consumers which impact how exchange process will be
conducted are “asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency”
[30, 31]. The most critical factor of these is asset specificity
because investment in assets which are specific in a transaction
make a commitment for both parties to the transaction for some
period of time. When the productive assets are non- specific, a
market contracting process is efficient. Thus this framework
provides good insights about issues of firm existence and
boundaries. Overall, this view considers the firm as a
governance structure which is crafted to economize on
transactions costs. Economies of scope [32] work and the role
of asset specificity in producing benefits from technological
innovation [33] are important examples of how the
combination of this view with strategic management can
extend knowledge in both fields.
C.4 A behavioral theory of the firm
This view in analyzing firms rejects the assumption of
rationality of “economic man.” The main focus of the
behavioral theory of the firm is to predict price, output, and
resource allocation decisions but with an clear focus on the
actual process of organizational decision making [34]. One
of the critics of traditional microeconomics view is Simon
[35] who mentions the goal of an organization is not profit
maximizing but ‘satisfying’ level of profits. He viewed
organizations as a system of individuals with multiple goals
who operate in a defined structure. Simultaneously, managerial
decision making is limited because they cannot build
comprehensive models of the world and
also
their
information
processing
is limited:
hence
optimum
(maximizing profit) is impossible since managers are

characterized by “bounded rationality” when the encounter
“uncertainty” and thus “behavioral rules” replace optimization.
Overall, the fundamental difference between the behavioral
theory of the firm and more classic theories is in the treatment
of rationality and uncertainty. In the determination of prices,
outputs and resource allocation, the decision-making process is
adaptively rational, with multiple objective and organizational
learning.
D. The Austrian school of thought
Although traditional industrial organization economics has
been one of the cornerstones of strategic thinking and research,
many of its assumptions have come under widespread
criticism. Some scholars have questioned the utility of IO
concepts because of an inadequate theoretical foundation. IO
largely neglects dynamical behavior and disequilibrium in the
dynamic world of business. But there was another school of
thought in economics that these characteristics were
fundamental building blocks of it: “Austrian economics.” In
this school, the emphasis is on “the dynamic market process”
and “entrepreneurial discovery” which are critical concepts for
strategy research.
The concept of “the market process” tends to distinguish
Austrian school. Unlike neo- classical theory that concentrates
on equilibrium with the static snapshot of the nature of
competition, Austrian economists view markets as processes of
dynamic finding that move scattered information. They assume
that earned profits of firms are through the entrepreneurial
discovery. Austrian economists state that for the economy to
land in equilibrium, innovations and discovery must be
discontinuous (i.e., Its appearance is only in discontinuous
clusters). They view innovation as a continuous process.
Therefore, the market is never in equilibrium. Market
inefficiencies enable a market not to be in equilibrium and
are responsible for money making opportunities. From this
perspective, the entrepreneur performs as an opportunity
catcher or arbitrager. The entrepreneur sees an opportunity
between what the resource market has to offer and what
customers will be willing to pay. By taking advantage of this
market inefficiencies, the entrepreneur receives the economic
profits from the arbitrage.
Indeed, their main focus is on entrepreneur inspired by the
desire for above-normal returns, as a motive for promoting
discovery and catching opportunities in a constantly changing
(disequilibrium) market. So, because competitors quickly
imitate known strategies to generate above-normal returns till
their return premium vanishes, these above-normal returns
achieved by discovery are just temporary. This means that
empirical modeling of business performance to find strategies
(business laws and some sort of order) that firms can
execute to achieve abnormal profits ‘will be largely
unsuccessful. Thus, because the returns to a given strategy
dissipate, firms must adapt and respond
to changing
conditions’.[3] As such, flexibility becomes a critical
strategic factor.
Indeed, business success is based on time and firm-specific
unobservable factors. This school sees profits not as the
consequence of monopoly power but rather as the result and

incentive for discovery and innovation. Under this perspective,
the goal of strategy formulation is not on limiting
competitive forces but rather on the entrepreneurial
discovery. Gluck, Kaufman, and Walleck [43] ‘maintained that
the essence of strategy is avoiding competition through an
indirect approach’.
Schumpeter discussed the critical roles of entrepreneur and
innovation in business success [44, 45]. He contended that
economic development occurs when firms implement new
products,
Production
processes,
and organizational
techniques. In his view, the entrepreneur disrupts the
market and push it toward out-of-equilibrium. Innovations
come into the market and innovator out-competes rivals and
earn profits. These abnormal profits provide the incentive
but are short-lived. As innovations are imitated, economic
profits dissipate and eventually vanish. Market returns to
equilibrium until another innovation takes place. This dynamic
process which shows moves from equilibriums to disequilibriums and vice versa is called “creative destruction.”
The profits achieved by innovation give the firm a time
window to pursue new innovations. Thus, the forces of
dynamic competition destroy any firm that merely attempts to
maintain status quo. The Schumpeter’s concept that sometimes
market is in equilibrium distinguishes his perspective from
Austrian mainstream.
E. Evolutionary economics
Evolutionary approaches have had a long history in
economics, but they have never shaped a formal position in the
mainstream of economics. In part, this has been due to the
diversity of evolutionary views in theorizing in range of
individuals to aggregates. It is also an issue of what it means to
say that a theory is "evolutionary" in the first place: is it make
sense the use of analogies to central concepts from
evolutionary biology, or is it something altogether different?
And if so, what is the status of such analogies [10]?
On a general level, the type of evolutionary theory that
refers to the area of strategy brings analogies to the biological
perspective of variation, inheritance, and selection. It tries to
give a real-time entity of social and economic phenomena in
terms of processes of change. Indeed, the process is an essential
part of the evolutionary approach. Within this evolutionary
view, companies have initially been modeled as possessing
path- dependent knowledge units (routines). The concept of
routines give a rationale for the relative robustness that is
essential for the successful utilization of selection issues. There
has been little tendency toward strategies that individual
companies express on the basis of these knowledge
fundamentals.
Nelson and Winter criticized IO because of its lack of
attention to dynamic environment brought about by
technological change [20]. The profits from successful
innovation are disequilibrium phenomena that come from lead
times over competition. The equilibrium analysis of IO does
not depict anything about innovation and entrepreneurship.
Nelson stated that if dynamic, disequilibrium, and institutional
complexity are notable concepts of what is going on, then
implications derived from the traditional theory must be viewed

by suspicious [46]. But economically, the theory of Nelson and
Winter is primarily, the same as its neoclassical counterpart, a
theory of industries, with less focus on the company, due
primarily to the importance it places on the selection
environment. Indeed, ‘evolutionary theory in the management
context until recently has dealt with understanding the
evolution of industries’ [47].
In addition, there is a lack of attention in evolutionary view
to firm behavior which is the suitable level that analogies to
heredity should be found. Concepts like adaptation,
learning, search, and path-dependence are mainly related to the
level of the firm. Some number of attempts has been made
to utilize evolutionary perspective to firm-level analysis.
Some of these are depicted in the increase in publications
regarding firm-level technology strategy from an evolutionary
perspective. The increasing interest that Williamson's version
of transaction cost theory has generated among
evolutionary theorists is further evidence. Finally, one should
mention Richard Nelson's in which the perspective has become
more firm-oriented [48]. The fact that industry-perspective
remains dominant in the realm of evolutionary view is due to
the narrow description of the firm and its resources.
F. Organizational ecology
Until now we reviewed the economic models broadly in
analyzing competition and strategy. We also noted some
advantages and disadvantages of such models. One more
perspective is called “organizational ecology.” This dynamic
framework is interested in the evolution of a system of
interacting companies, in particular, how the population of
them changes over time. The use of organizational/population
ecology models [47] in strategy and competition is a clear
example that how techniques and models from other disciplines
might be useful.
In this perspective, based on the Darwinian concept of the
“survival of the fittest” it proposes models that certain firms
take positions that possess higher fitness than others in the
population of firms. The premise here is that fittest firms will
survive and others go out of business. The evolution of an
industry can be modeled by considering how diverse types of
firms compete over time, and how some population of firms
survives longer than others. Behind organizational ecology
is the notion that only limited resources are available in a
market. This approach goes beyond industry analysis and
suggests that certain positions within an industry can still be
attractive even when there are dominant incumbents. This
perspective provides the opportunity for the analysis of smaller
firms and also the fact that some firms may fail.
Although organizational ecology tries to consider that
firms are of certain types and therefore assumes that there is
heterogeneity among companies, this characteristic is not
modeled explicitly. Moreover, there is a high level of
formalization in this perspective where mathematical
relationships between variables are modeled. Also, there is a
problem of translation from natural science definition of
genotypes to firms as constituents of the population. Another
problem is the fitness optimization that can be viewed as an
analogy of utility maximization from within economics, and as

I noted earlier there are common problems associated with
maximization (e.g., “satisfaction” proposed by Simon)
approaches within management science.
III. STRATEGIC MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS
A. Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP)
At the heart of this view is this assumption that firm exists
to hinder output through the monopoly power or collusive
behavior with other firms. firms want to restrain output so that
market price goes up and therefore successful firm will
make a profit from the difference between this artificially high
market price and its costs. From the economic point of view,
these above-normal returns reflect the nefarious firm behavior
that occurs at the expense of consumers. In this approach, a
major focus has been empirical testing of “structure-conductperformance” hypothesis articulated by Bain [23, 24, 25]. In
this hypothesis, structure of industry determines firm conduct
(strategy) which in turn determines economic performance.
Because firm conduct is supposed to be determined by industry
structure, conduct is often neglected, and the association
between structure and performance has been examined.
In this view motivation for expansion is increasing
monopolization, or alternatively, preventing another firm from
gaining monopoly control. Bain idea was that the notion of
"perfect competition" ‘sets the standard for traditional
industrial organization and provides the foundation’ for the
premise that firms earn super-normal returns primarily by
exercising monopoly power [23]. But, a big departure from
perfect competition view is that this view encompasses the
richer concept of firm heterogeneity; although perfect
competition predicts that there are no persistent performance
differentials when the market is in equilibrium, Mason/Bain IO
holds an opposite approach. The assumption is that persistent
above-normal profits are based upon long-lasting although
limited types of heterogeneity between firms; based on
different studies these heterogeneities come in the forms of
dominance in firm size, market share and collusion in and
between industries.
B. Five forces framework and strategic groups
After reviewing different types of economic formal
frameworks and models, we focus now on more recently
developed frameworks of competition and strategy. One of the
most impactful contributions to the field of strategy and
competitiveness was the work of Porter [1, 2]. In Porter’s
seminal work which its roots go back to the industrial
organization and in particular, Structure-Conduct- Product
paradigm [49], the main task of a strategist is to find the answer
for two questions: where to compete (which industry)? How to
compete? (defendable position in that industry). Indeed,
Porter used IO concepts but from the frame of reference
of a strategist. Although in IO the purpose of economists was
how to grow competition, Porter reversed the point of view of
that purpose and proposed a model under which how managers
and firms could limit competition for higher returns. His Five
Forces model asserts that there are five determinants that
ascertain the attractiveness of an industry. The Five Forces are
as follows: the bargaining power of the firms supplying the

industry; the bargaining power of buyers; the threat of new
firms potentially entering the market; the threat of substitute
products; and the intensity of competitive rivalry.
In Porter’s view, strategy means “positioning.” Firms need
to develop their strategies through a mixture of competitive
dimensions, such as branding, pricing policy, higher product
quality, better logistics, etc. these are enablers through which
firms could gain an achievable and defendable position in an
industry. This position enables the firm to gain above-average
profits in the industry. Indeed, the meaning of strategy in this
view is finding a defendable position that protects the firm’s
competitive advantage from actions of five forces that shape
competition in the industry. Perhaps due to the influential effect
of Porte’s work in the 1980s, the basis of economics within
strategy field has appeared to be unquestioned. In spite of
strong features of this model, it has also been criticized because
of its static nature. Hamel and Prahalad described this analysis
as: “a snapshot of a moving car [50]. By itself, the photograph
yields little information about the car’s speed or direction –
whether the driver is out for a quiet Sunday drive or warming
up for the Grand Prix.”
In addition, Porter introduced the concept of strategic
groups that followed the works of Hunt further developed by
McGee and Thomas [2, 51]. In this concept firms that were in
seemingly oligopolistic markets could be grouped into
classifications. These firms remarkably follow similar
strategies. Porter looked to the IO literature to give an
explanation for this grouping of firms. In strategic groups
framework firm are depicted on two-dimensional axes by their
strategic attributes. One limitation of the strategic groups
framework is that it considers the positioning of firms within
this strategy space at one moment in time, and does not take
into account the dynamics of the changes of position over time,
changes that can be as a result of the reactions of one firm’s
positioning affecting the subsequent positions of firms over
time.
C. The resource-based view of the firm
Another main attempt to explain differences between firms,
their heterogeneity, came from the resource-based view of the
firm. Scholars such as [12, 56] see resources as being the most
important components of a firm. Wernerfelt developed the
notion of the resource-based view of the firm, building on the
work of Penrose that perceived a firm as a bundle of resources
[12]. The work of Penrose is considered a very fundamental
and impactful one as a basis in this framework. Other notable
contributions include [8, 9, 20, 32, 58, 59, 60]. Like early
strategy scholars, these authors are primarily interested in
differences across firms. What differentiates them is their use
of economic reasoning, notably the economics of Ricardian and
Paretian rents. In particular, the question of why some
firms
earn supernormal profits has received careful
consideration. While theoretical and empirical research in
industrial organization economics has shown that a firm's
profits are related to its choice of [3, 61], resource-based
reasoning examines this question from the perspective of interfirm differences.

The central assumption underlying resource-based theory is
heterogeneity of resources. It means resource bundles and
capabilities of production are heterogeneous among companies
[56]. This concept implies that since resources are
heterogeneously distributed among firms, and these resources
are not in unlimited supply and are scarce, firms with superior
resources will gain rents. It’s the known Ricardian rent. The
crucial notion is that the supply of “superior” resources
remains limited. So, efficient firms with superior resources
can sustain this competitive advantage just by their resources
that can’t be developed freely or be imitated by competitors.
What make distinction of monopoly profits from Ricardian
ones is that monopoly profits is the outcome of restriction of
output rather than an inherent scarcity of resource supply.
In resource-based view, sustained competitive advantage
needs the condition of heterogeneity be maintained. If it’s a
short-lived phenomenon, profits will be ephemeral as well.
Since firms are primarily looking for consistent and long-term
rents, the condition of heterogeneity must be durable to add
value. So there must be mechanisms which restrict competition
for those type of rents. Rumelt introduced 'isolating
mechanisms' ‘which protect individual firms from imitation
and preserve their rent streams’ [59]. Another notion is causal
ambiguity [58]. This means the uncertainty regarding the
causes of efficiency differences among firms. There are very
important contributions for isolating mechanisms and defying
imitation in the literature including [9, 33, 49, 59, 62, 63, 64].
In spite of its considerable advancement, the resource-based
view has some number of weaknesses. A case in point is that
it’s often difficult to recognize which resource or combination
of resources accounts for firm’s successful performance in the
real world. This difficulty in assessment is likely due to the fact
that it is impossible to measure them in isolation. As Porter
noted, resources are valuable only if they "allow firms to
perform activities that create advantages in particular markets"
[21]. Another important contextual factor is the issue of
resource complementarity. It means resources are contingent
on other resources, so the system of resources is matter.
Furthermore, the value of resources changes over time.
In addition, resource-based view theory of the firm applies
both process and equilibrium constructs, although
inconsistencies between these are rarely acknowledged. Indeed
resource-based view roots go back to a neo-classical theory
which is clear in the equilibrium concept of sustainable
competitive advantage [8]. On the other hand, many of the
more practical contributions [65] deal explicitly with the
process. So there is a need for further research regarding more
precise definitions of resources and capabilities and also
solving the conflict between dual concepts of equilibrium and
process taken in this theory.
D. Delta framework
It is evident in the literature of strategy that Porter’s
industry analysis and the resource-based view (RBV) of the
firm have had the highest impact and attention. From these
perspectives, firms should either find an attractive industry and
position accordingly or excel on unique resources and
capabilities. Although these frameworks have often been
considered conflicting rather complementary, Hax and Wilde

focused on the complementarity of views and propose a model
called “Delta”( Delta is a Greek letter means transformation
and change) [90]. But they contend that one missing piece in
both of these frameworks is the “customer.” Hax and Wilde
mention that “If you take Porter literally, the customer is
represented by the “Buyer” – one of the Five Forces – whose
bargaining power we should resist or diminish [90]. In that
respect, the customer constitutes an additional element of
the rivalry that we need to overcome. In the ResourceBased View of the Firm, there is no explicit mention of the
customer.” They assert that in the internet era, linking customer
and enterprise through using network technology creates new
sources of strategic options. Hax and Wilde contend that their
Delta model is integrative of two main prior frameworks in
strategy [90]. They say: “ Porter’s framework and the
Resource-Based View differ in explaining the sources of
profitability. Porter associates it with monopolistic rent that
flows from industry structure. The Resource-Based View of the
firm ties it to the corporation’s internal capabilities. They share
the perspective that business is akin to war and that designing
business strategy is akin to playing a zero-sum game.
Profitability accrues to those who are superior to their
competitors. The Delta Model takes issue with this almost
obsessive focus on competition.” It is also clear that at the heart
of Delta model is a customer. They explain it this way: “We
believe that a firm owes itself to its customers. They are the
ultimate repository of all the firm’s activities. At the heart of
management and, certainly, at the heart of strategy, besides the
customer. We have to serve the customer in a distinctive way if
we expect to enjoy superior performance. The name of the
game is to attract, to satisfy, and to retain the customer.” They
put the “customer bonding” concept at the center of strategy
formulation. According to their view, they propose three
strategic options for firms: “system-lock in” under which firms
make proprietary platforms that lock-out other competitors,
“total customer solutions” that based upon firms reduce
customer costs or increase their profits, “best product” which
options are low-cost or differentiation. Finally, they suggest
their winning formula as follows [90]:
•

•

•

•

“Concentrate on the customer. Start with a careful
segmentation of your customer base and develop as
much knowledge as possible of the customer
economics. Remember that the primary objective is to
seek customer bonding.
Select the most appropriate strategic positioning
among the three key options – Best Product, Total
Customer Solutions, and System Lock-In – that will
result in a customer value proposition with the highest
possible bonding.
Define the strategic agenda that determines the
action program to implement your desired strategic
option. Assure the proper alignment with the three
adaptive processes – Operational Effectiveness,
Customer Targeting, and Innovation.
Design the proper metrics and rewards to facilitate the
strategy development.”

E. Game theory and co-opetition
The concept of rational decision makers who can make
decisions that maximize their utility is the basis of game
theory. Game theory is about understanding reactions of
competitors to your actions. If we think from the competitor’s
point of view, we are able to make decisions that are better than
when we think in isolation as a stand-alone player. The
application of game theory in strategy and management has
been widespread [52] whereby more than one player interacts
with other players by playing certain strategies; outcomes of
plays are depicted in “payoff” matrices. The crucial aspect of
the game theory is that your payoff depends on the strategies of
your competitors. There are central assumptions in game
theory: the competitor will behave rationally and will try to
win; the competitor is independent in relation to other
competitors; competitors are aware of the interdependencies
and the actions that competitors could do. To benefit from
game theory, strategists need to put themselves in the position
of their competitors; they need to take an informed view on the
likely competitor actions and choose the best course of action.
Also, Brandenburger and Nalebuff applied the concept of game
theory to business under the name of ‘Co-opetition’ [53]. They
simultaneously considered competitors in an industry
competitor and cooperator. They assert that if the firm is seen
of this view, this may benefit all firms in the industry.
Game theory created high expectations in the field of
strategy as an analytical tool for analyzing the dynamics of
interaction between firms. But, this early promise has not
entirely come into reality with strategy work. There are several
reasons for this issue. First, in order to make game theory
models relevant, the firms under consideration should be the
same size. Second, there are only a limited number of strategies
that firms can play. Third, the focus is on the equilibrium
outcome, although contemporary game theory research on
repeated games addresses this problem [54]. However, these
recent developments largely have been in economics world
and not strategy field. In Porter’s paper ‘Towards a Dynamic
Theory of Strategy’ [21], he mentions that although game
theory may be seen as dynamic, in that there is a sequence of
actions made by firms, this is not a dynamic theory: ’by
concentrating sequentially on small numbers of variables, the
models fail to capture the simultaneous choices over many
variables that characterize most industries. The models force
homogeneity of strategies. Yet it is the trade-offs and
interactions involved in configuring the entire set of activities
in the value chain that define distinct competitive positions.
Finally, the models hold fixed many variables that we know are
changing.’
Moreover, most of game theory models rest on the
assumption that the players are perfectly rational: it means
the predictability of competitor’s actions and thus playing
optimal strategies. In addition, much of the research in game
theory is used to determine Nash equilibrium: where no one
player has an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium
strategy. However, it should be asked whether such
assumptions can provide a suitable methodology for analyzing
problems in the real world of business or for the competitive
system which often is not in equilibrium.

F. Dynamic Capabilities
One of the criticisms to resource-based view of the firm is
that it neglects the external environment. Also, the notion that
the distribution of resources remains stable over time does not
provide a realistic notion of interfirm competition in high
turbulence times when the resources that may have been the
source of competitive advantage in the past may now not be
of use. Moreover, there is much confusing terminology,
sometimes conflicting, within the area of resource-based
view of the firm.
Indeed, Teece in their key work on dynamic capabilities
goes so far as to say ‘we do not like the term ‘‘resource’’ and
believe it is misleading’ [19]. So scholars extended the
resource-based view of the firm and proposed the notion of
dynamic capabilities. The same as resource-based view,
terminology definition in dynamic capabilities is also difficult.
Dosi describes the ‘terminological anarchy’ of the resourcebased view: ‘the term ‘‘capabilities’’ floats in the literature
like an iceberg in a foggy Arctic sea, one iceberg among many,
not easily recognized as different from several icebergs nearby’
[66]. Makadok uses the rather obvious definition of resources:
‘organizationally embedded non- transferable firm-specific
resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the
other resources possessed by the firm’ [67]. Teece defines
dynamic capabilities as ‘the firm’s ability to integrate, build,
and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address
rapidly changing environments’ [19]. This definition considers
both the resource-based view and the notion of rapidly
changing environments. Teece asserts that ‘capabilities cannot
easily be bought; they must be built.’ Although resources can
be ‘picked’ in order to bring them within the firm, capabilities
are different: they are built not acquired – capabilities are
embedded within the organization whereas resources are not.
Winter distinguishes between ‘ordinary’ organizational
capabilities and dynamic capabilities [68]. Putting his
definition on his earlier work with Nelson [20], organizational
capabilities are defined as a ‘high-level routine (or collection of
routines) that, together with its implementing input flows,
confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision
options for producing significant outputs of a particular type’,
basing the concept on routines: ‘behavior that is learned, highly
patterned, repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in
tacit knowledge – and the specificity of objectives’. What
makes dynamic from ordinary capabilities is that dynamic
capabilities are concerned with change and learning. The
concept is that dynamic capabilities determine change rate of
organizational capabilities.
Eisenhardt and Martin contend that dynamic capabilities are
of several types: firms may use dynamic capabilities to create,
integrate, recombine, and release resources from the firm [57].
They also distinguish between dynamics capabilities in ‘high
velocity’ and stable markets situations: in high-velocity
environments, dynamic capabilities are experiential (i.e., not
analytic), iterative (i.e., non-linear), and are inherently simple
in nature. In markets that are moderately dynamic, they suggest
that dynamic capabilities become efficient and robust
routines become embedded in cumulative, existing
knowledge within the firm. In other words, effective dynamic
capabilities enable a firm to adapt to a changing and turbulent

environment. They assert that although dynamic capabilities
are idiosyncratic, ‘they exhibit commonalities or ‘best practice’
across firms. Their broad structural patterns vary with market
dynamism, ranging from the robust, grooved routines in
moderately dynamic markets to fragile semi-structured ones in
high- velocity ones. They evolve via well-known learning
mechanisms.’ They finally conclude that lies in resource
configurations, not dynamic capabilities. Teece suggests that
‘Further theoretical and organizational work is needed to
tighten the framework, empirical research is critical to helping
us understand how firms get to be good, how they sometimes
stay that way, why and how they improve, and why they
sometimes decline’ [19].
G. Hyper-competition and Environmental Turbulence
The turbulent competitive environment is precisely the
opposite of stable landscape. In such industries, the roles of
different competitors are blurred. They rely on more complex
and diverse combination of competitive dimensions at the time
of designing their competitive strategies.
This makes
prediction rather difficult, and in some conditions misleading.
These landscapes require new ways of thinking about
competition and industry dynamics. The dynamic capabilities
approach mentioned earlier has been an attempt to respond to
the challenges posed by the turbulent competitive environment.
As we saw in [19] seminal definition of dynamic capabilities,
firms may have to deal with rapidly changing environments.
This concept has been used by diverse words: turbulence, highvelocity environments, and hypercompetitive environments
[69].
D’Aveni depicts the notion of ‘hyper-competition’ – a state
that is defined as: ‘[resulting] from the dynamics of strategic
maneuvering among global and innovative combatants [69,
70]. It is a condition of rapidly escalating competition based on
price- quality positioning, competition to create know-how and
establish a first-mover advantage, competition to protect or
invade established a product or geographic markets, and
competition based on deep pockets and the creation of even
deeper pocketed alliances the frequency, boldness, and
aggressiveness of dynamic movement by the players accelerate
to create a condition of constant disequilibrium and change, in
other words; environments escalate toward higher and higher
levels of uncertainty, dynamism, heterogeneity of the players,
and hostility’.
D’Aveni assumes that there is a new type of
competition – ‘hyper-competition,’ completely different from
the traditional notion: ‘in the old days of stable environments,
companies created fairly rigid strategies designed to fit the
long-term conditions of the environment’ [69]. D’Aveni’s idea
is that competitive equilibrium was in the past where “less
dominant firms accepted their secondary status because they
were given the opportunity to survive by a leading firm that
avoided competing too aggressively.” One major reason to
focus on turbulent environments has been the static nature
of strategy and competition frameworks but dynamic nature of
the environment. Teece asserts that existing models for
analyzing strategy have not proved useful at understanding
sources of competitive advantage in times of rapid change [19].
If we observe that the business environment in the real

world is dynamic and complicated, it’s not reasonable to
consider models developed under concepts of equilibrium,
stability, and linearity.
Hence, several scholars suggested different concepts for
making strategy in a turbulent environment. Hamel and
Prahalad propose the concept of “strategic intent” for guiding
strategy [50]. According to their idea, strategic intent is the
overall direction of a company that captures the essence of
winning, is stable over time, and sets a goal that deserves
personal effort and commitment. This thought brings to mind a
stable and systematic pattern that take the company toward a
valuable and determined target. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt
suggest the “imitation” strategy for surviving in the
turbulent environment [71]. In this strategy, follower goes
towards the position of leader. Brown and Eisenhardt assert
that such movement should be made incrementally [72]. Rivkin
suggests the imitation of complex strategies [73]. He applies
NK model in his analysis and assumes that there is
interconnectedness between strategies. Overall, these studies
show that the ability of rapid and continuous change is a crucial
capability in high- velocity markets.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CLASSICAL ECONOMIC-BASED
APPROACH

The formalization of economic models is actually based on
explicit nature of model that brings a certain amount of rigor to
the formulation process. However, there are important
limitations when the economic view is used, particularly in the
way that equilibrium is an assumption of this framework. Also,
when firms in an industry are supposed to be homogenous, and
the emphasis is on stasis. These limitations are significant in
using this framework in strategic management. It’s crystal clear
that most industries are not in an idealized form of equilibrium
and the notion of how to deal with “turbulent” and maybe
“hyper-competitive” environments is an active area of research.
Economic models introduced earlier essentially assume
equilibrium outcomes. This thought that competitors finally
will settle down into a stasis can only be applicable in an
idealized competition where there is nothing more than pushing
and knocking out competing firm out of equilibrium. One of
the core tenets of neo-classical economics also is assumed in
many models, “rationality.” According to this assumption
actors (such as firms) will behave in a way that maximizes their
utility under the given constraints. But, actors in the real world
such as strategists do not always behave rationally - they may
follow ‘boundedly rational’ behavior [35], and not
optimize their utility functions. Simons contends that firms
follow to get a level of “satisfaction” in their objectives and
don’t necessarily maximize their utility. Indeed, Porter himself
[21] notes: “it is well known that [industrial organization]
models are highly sensitive to the assumptions underlying them
and to the concept of equilibrium that is employed.” Moreover,
while game theory was seen as a potential field for modeling
dynamics of strategy and competition, the involving of more
than two firms into the market poses additional problems. One
firm among many of firms may move and perturb the entire
competitive system.

In addition, economic models suppose that the world
jumps immediately to an equilibrium. But one main point that
is not considered is the path to equilibrium. Also, this
equilibrium assumption means there are not any space for
innovation and no incentive for firms to change strategies. It
seems these models are considered to exist in isolation, where
there are no environmental shocks, or indeed external
environment does not have any effect on the system for
pushing it out of equilibrium. Knott introduces the problem:
‘the goal of the strategy is persistent profits – in short, to
overcome the microeconomic equilibrium of homogeneous
firms with zero profits’ [55]. More specifically, this
equilibrium is rather the equilibrium of the model than we
observe in the real world.
One more problem in using the microeconomic approach in
modeling strategy issues is its over-emphasis on the
homogeneity of firms. This assumption eliminates the
possibility of analyzing the impact of differences between firms
on their performance in an industry. More recent theoretical
approaches in formulating competition and strategy such as
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm [8, 56] and the dynamic
capabilities approach [19, 57] are specifically focused on
realizing how intrafirm heterogeneity leads to differences in
firm’s strategies and performance.
V. COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS WORKAROUND
The research stream of competitive dynamics which its
intellectual roots go back to Schumpeter’s concept of creative
destruction has progressed in recent years in the mainstream
literature of research on strategy and competition. The focus of
this view is on dynamic processes by which firms act upon and
react to one another in the pursuit of market opportunities.
Firms act and competitors respond, and these interactions
determine survival and long-term performance. ‘Similarly,
the Austrian school of economics [74, 75, 76] considered
competition to be a dynamic market process rather than a static
market condition.’ The core is the process by which market
moves. It’s this movement and not an equilibrium that is taken
to be of interest. Also based on this school of thought, since the
market is in disequilibrium advantage is a limited temporal
window for exploitation, so it is transient [77, 78].
According to definitions, the competitive dynamic is the
study of inter-firm hard competition based on specific
“competitive actions and reactions,” their strategic and
organizational context, and their motives and outcomes [79,
80]. The intent of this perspective has been mainly to address
more fine-grained questions regarding competition: how do
firms act and rivals react when they compete? Why some firms
compete in a particular way? How do competitive interactions
influence performance and vice versa [81, 82]?
In the field of strategic management, seminal works of
MacMillan & Von and Bettis & Weeks’s used this frame of
reference [83, 84]. They were the beginning of competitive
dynamics research in the realm of strategy. Other works
followed these earlier studies. The main premise of this stream
of research is that it can provide a useful integrative framework
for strategy by bridging micro-actor and macro- competitive
viewpoints. Chen outlined five research themes in this field

[85]: “(1) competitive interaction: action-level studies; (2)
strategic competitive behavior and repertoire: business-level
studies; (3) multimarket and multi-business competition:
corporate-level
studies;
(4)
integrative
competitor
analysis; and (5) competitive perception. “ There are also
some studies in integrating competitive dynamics and RBV
frameworks [86, 87, 88]. However, there are several gaps in
this stream of research that one of the most important for
example is integrating micro and macro perspectives [89].
VI. TOWARD THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEXITY
We have reviewed several models from different
perspectives in earlier sections. What is clear is that most of
them are based on paradigms of equilibrium, linearity,
rationality, optimization, etc. We may need more
systematic views which are based on disequilibrium,
nonlinearity, behavioral rules, networked interaction and so
forth. One promising area that might address such phenomena
in the analysis of competition and strategy is complexity
science, and in particular, the economics of complexity.
Complexity has arisen as a new unifying and systematic
theory to understand the nature of commonalities and change
across a variety of disciplines ranging from mathematics,
physics, biology, economics, social science, etc. complexity
takes a systemic approach under which nonlinear interactions
among agents (constituents of system) in micro level will result
in macro and emergent behaviors that cannot be realized just
by studying agents. Complexity builds on some
assumption:
Heterogeneous agents; means agents are intrinsically
heterogeneous by character. Local information means
knowledge of agents is local and no one can have the
information of the whole system. Non-linearity; interactions
among
agents
are non-linear
in
nature. Systemic
interdependence; result of the behavior of individual agent is
dependent on the chain of communications in the system.
Phase transition; small changes in the parameters of the system
change the behavior and outcomes as the system goes from
changing its phase. Non-ergodicity; means a little trigger at a
particular point in time impacts the long-term dynamics of a
system. Emergent properties; properties of a system that
arise at the aggregate level; simply put, means whole is greater
than some of the parts. A core aspect of complexity is how
interacting agents produce system-level patterns that those
agents in turn react to. This leads to the emergence of aggregate
properties and structures that are not observable at lower levels.
There is a review of complexity theory applications to
economics in [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96]. It has been asserted that
complexity is very frequent in economic issues [97]. Based on
equilibrium concept and reductionist approach in classical
economics, aggregation is simply the sum of parts. It means
dynamics of a system is the only simple sum of the dynamic of
constituent parts. This view clearly does not consider
interdependencies and positive/negative feedbacks in the
interaction of parts. What classical models fail to realize is
correct view toward aggregation where the concept of
“emergence” enters the scene. Schelling notion [98] of
emergence means the spontaneous formation of self-organized
patterns at different levels of a hierarchy [99]. Simon explain a

complex system in this form: “Roughly, by a complex system I
mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a
non- simple way [100]. In such systems, the whole is more than
the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical sense, but
in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of
the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial
matter to infer the properties of the whole. In the face of
complexity, an in-principle reductionist may be at the same
time a pragmatic holist.”
From the perspective of complexity, ABM (agent-based
modeling) can be used as a bridge between micro and macro.
In ABM models aggregate outcomes (the whole, e.g., the
differential firm performance) are estimated as the sum of
individual characteristics (its parts, e.g., firm’s size). However,
system-level behavior is often distinguishable from the
behavior of agents which make up the whole, resulting to the
discovery of emergent properties [101, 102]. In this view, the
whole is greater than the sum of parts. Also, it might happen in
a way that seems system follow a distinct logic, with its
objectives and means. ABM provides a technique that allows
systematic analysis of dynamics and emergent properties at the
macroscopic level. The ABM methodology introduced by
complexity stream of research uses bottom-up approach and is
focused on the interaction of many heterogeneous agents,
which may produce a statistical equilibrium. [94, 95, 103,
104, 105]. ABM allows making models with heterogeneous
(e.g. heterogeneous firm in competition) agents based
on simple behavioral rules and interactions (e.g. competitive
behaviors) between them, where the resulting systemic and
macro dynamics and empirical regularities (e.g., statistical
equilibrium,
maybe we can call it, differential firm
performance) are not known and deductible from behavior of
agents [106]. This system doesn’t always need to be in
equilibrium (assumption of most economic models) and based
on interactions could change its phase and goes from one
equilibrium to another. What is surprising in this perspective is
that it has both views of IO and Austrian schools in itself. It is
dynamic processes (Austrian) that give rise to emergent
(e.g., creative destruction) properties, and simultaneously
system can sometimes be in equilibrium (IO view). So I assert
that these prior perspectives in modeling competition are not
contradictory, but each one of them only points to one aspect of
the problem. Complexity perspective and in particular ABM
provides the significant potential to model and understand the
dynamics of competition and strategy. Identification of the
advantages of such approach has been highlighted in social
science has been highlighted in the literature as well [107, 108,
109].
VII. COMPARISION OF STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES
From a historical review of different perspective regarding
strategy and competition it’s explicitly evident that most of

proposed models and theories are derived from three economic
approaches: industrial organization economics, Austrian
economics, and evolutionary economics. In this regard,
existing perspectives and tools available in the economics of
complexity can bring value to the research field of strategic
management. In addition, as shown in table I, important
models of strategy in the realm of strategic management
research evolved from static to more dynamic approaches.
Therefore, it reveals that deriving perspectives from system
theories and science of complexity and complex systems can
add to the toolbox of strategy scholars and they can dig deeper
in realizing dynamics processes and behaviors that create outof-equilibrium conditions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are many frameworks and models of competition and
strategy that have made significant steps towards unifying and
integrating different aspects of competition. While most of
them are based on economic paradigms and models, some of
them adopted views from other fields of science such as
sociology, systems science, psychology, biology, etc. after
reviewing different frameworks of competitive behaviors
and strategy in the literature we contend that models have
used different perspectives and frames of reference in response
to the differential firm performance within and across
industries, but all of them are trying to answer the original issue
in strategy realm. There exist both commonalities and
contradictions among proposed frameworks. Most of them are
based on economic theories of the firm, but some applications
from other fields of study are evident. Fundamental issues such
as rationality, unit of analysis, used research methods,
equilibrium, level of aggregation and dynamics require further
research in the field. But one thing is evident from the
evolution of strategy frameworks that models proposed
intended to be more dynamic. For further research, we suggest
scholars pay attention to different frameworks systematically
and attempt to unify and integrate these fragmented
perspectives.
Strategy
researchers
must
approach
interdisciplinary research with rigor, with a firm grounding
and understanding of the relevant theories and techniques from
other fields which they seek to integrate with strategy. Because
the final goal of the strategy is to find a systematic and
dynamic theory which can consider different features of
competition and strategy in a unified model (consider internal
and external), and also could explain differential firm
performance and competitive advantage. Although because
of complex and dynamic business idiosyncrasies in time and
space, such natural laws of strategy may not be guaranteed. We
can be hopeful to find some patterns on macro levels that are
useful.

TABLE I.

MODELS OF STRATEGY WITHIN STATIC TO MORE DYNAMIC APPROACHES

Basic assumption

Level of
analysis

origin

Focus

Competitive
Advantage

Competitive
strategy

Dynamic
consideration

StructureConductPerformance

Industry structure
determines
competition and
profitability

Macro
industry

Industrial
organization
economics

Structure
determines
strategy and
then
performance

Can be
created and
sustained

A
mathematical
model with an
equilibrium
solution

Competition in an
industry

Five-Force
analysis

Industry structure
determines
competition and
profitability

Macro
industry
level

Industrial
organization
economics

Five forces
that make up
the industry
structure

Competitive
advantage
can be
created and
sustained

Generic types

Comparison between
two-time points.
Industry in
equilibrium

RBV

Firms in the same
industry perform
differently because,
even in equilibrium,
firms differ in terms of
resources and
capabilities they
control

Companies
and
businesses

Ricardian rents and
Penrosian theory of
the growth of the
firm

Bundle of
resources
among firms

Competitive
advantage
can be
created and
sustained

Excel on
unique and
scarce
resources and
capabilities

Uses both
equilibrium and
process concepts

Delta model

The customer is at the
heart of management
and strategy

Companies
and
businesses

Customer
Bonding

Competitive
advantage
can be
created and
sustained

Best customer
solution,
system-lock in,
and best
product

Not clear idea about
dynamics of market

Reactions of
competitors to
your actions

No clear idea
about
sustainability
of
competitive
advantage

Playing
different
competitive
games

Analytical tool and
equilibrium outcomes

Penrose and RBV

Dynamic
capabilities

Competitive
advantage
can be
created and
sustained

Learning and
reconfiguration
of bundle of
resources

Changing and
dynamic market
environments

Strategic intent
and imitation

Non equilibrium
competition

Dynamics of
actions and
reactions

Competitive
interactive behaviors
between two firms

Five forces and RBV

Game
theory

Competitive
interactions between
competitors

Inter-firm
competition

Industrial
organization
economics

Dynamic
capabilities

Importance of
dynamic processes,
including acquisition,
development, and
maintenance of
differential bundles of
resources and
capabilities over time

Companies
and
businesses

Hypercompetition

Strategic maneuvering
in hyper-competitive
markets

Rivalry
among
firms

Austrian economics

Turbulent and
hypercompetitive
environments

Competitive
dynamics

Dynamic competition
and action/reaction of
firms determine
performance

Micro firm
actions

Theoretical/empirical
work extended from
Schumpeter and
Austrian economics

Individual or
dyadic action
of firms

REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]

J. B. Barney and A. M. Arikan, “The resource-based view: Origins and
implications,” Handbook of strategic management, vol. 124188, 2001.
C. Zott, “Dynamic capabilities and the emergence of intraindustry
differential firm performance: insights from a simulation study,”
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 97–125, Feb. 2003.
M. Porter, “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy,” Harvard
Business Review, vol. 57, no.2, pp. 137–45, 1979.
M. E. Porter, “Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing
Industries and Competitors,” 1980.
R. Schmalensee, “Do Markets Differ Much?,” American Economic
Review, vol. 75, no.3, pp. 341–51, 1985.
R. P. Rumelt, “How much does industry matter?,” Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 12, no.3, pp. 167–185, 1991.

[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]

Transient
and
ephemeral
competitive
advantage
Competitive
advantage is
ephemeral
and relative
advantages
exist

A. M. McGAHAN, M. E. Porter, “How Much Does Industry Matter,
Really?,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 18, no.S1, pp. 15–30,
1997.
A. M. McGahan, “The Performance of US Corporations: 1981–1994,”
The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 47, no.4, pp. 373–398,
1999.
R. Amit, P. J. H. Schoemaker, “Strategic assets and organizational
rent,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 14, no.1, pp. 33–46, 1993.
J. B. Barney, “Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck, and
Business Strategy,” Management Science, vol. 32, no.10, pp. 1231–
1241, 1986.
I. Dierickx, K. Cool, “Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of
Competitive Advantage,” Management Science, vol. 35, no.12, pp.
1504–1511, 1989.

[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]

E. Penrose, C. Pitelis, “The Theory of the Growth of the Firm,” (4
edition). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
M. A. Peteraf, “The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A
resource-based view,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 14, no.3, pp.
179–191, 1993.
B. Wernerfelt, “A resource-based view of the firm,” Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 5, no.2, pp. 171–180, 1984.
D. C. Galunic, K. M. Eisenhardt, “Architectural Innovation and
Modular Corporate Forms,” Academy of Management Journal, vol.
44, no.6, pp. 1229–1249, 2001.
R. Henderson, I. Cockburn, “Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm
Effects in Pharmaceutical Research,” Strategic Management Journal,
vol. 15, no.S1, pp. 63–84, 1994.
M. Iansiti, K. B. Clark, “Integration and dynamic capability: evidence
from product development in automobiles and mainframe computers,”
Industrial and corporate change, vol. 3, no.3, pp. 557-605, 1994.
B. Kogut, U. Zander, “Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative
Capabilities, and the Replication of Technology,” Organization
Science, vol. 3, no.3, pp. 383–397, 1992.
G. Szulanski, “Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the
transfer of best practice within the firm,” Strategic Management
Journal, vol. 17, no.S2, pp. 27–43, 1996.
U. Zander, B. Kogut, “Knowledge and the Speed of the Transfer and
Imitation of Organizational Capabilities: An Empirical Test,”
Organization Science, vol. 6, no.1, pp. 76–92, 1995.
D. J. Teece, G. Pisano, A. Shuen, “Dynamic capabilities and strategic
management,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 18, no.7, pp. 509–
533, 1997.
R. Nelson, S. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change,
Cambridge MA: Belknap Harvard, 1982.
M. E. Porter, “Towards a dynamic theory of strategy,” Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 12, no.S2, pp. 95–117, 1991.
P. Ghemawat, B. Cassiman, “Introduction to the Special Issue on
Strategic Dynamics,” Management Science, vol. 53, no.4, pp. 529–536,
2007.
J. S. Bain, “Workable Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical
Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence,” The American
Economic Review, vol. 40, no.2, pp. 35–47, 1950.
J. S. Bain, “Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration:
American Manufacturing, 1936-1940,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, vol. 65, no.3, pp. 293–324, 1951.
J. S. Bain, “Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of
Entry in Twenty Manufacturing Industries,” The American Economic
Review, vol. 44, no.1, pp. 15–39, 1954.
G. J. Stigler, “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 72, no.1, pp. 44–61, 1964.
H. Demsetz, “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,”
The Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 16, no.1, pp. 1–9, 1973.
R. H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, vol. 4, no.16, pp.
386–405, 1937.
O. E. Williamson, Chapter 3 Transaction cost economics. Handbook
of Industrial Organization, vol. 1, pp. 135–182, 1989.
O. E. Williamson, “The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution,
Attributes,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol.19, no.4, pp. 1537–
1568, 1981.
O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID
1496720). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1985.
D. J. Teece, “Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise,”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 1, no.3, pp. 223–
247, 1980.
D. J. Teece, “Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for
integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy,” Research
Policy, vol. 15, no.6, pp. 285–305, 1986.
R. Jacobson, “The ‘Austrian’ School of Strategy,” ACAD MANAGE
REV, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 782–807, Oct. 1992.
R. M. Cyert, J. G. March, Behavioral Theory of the Firm (2 edition).
Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992.
H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan, 1957.
K. R. Andrews, The concept of corporate strategy. New York: Dow
Jones-Irwin, 1971.
I. Ansoff, Corporate strategy. New York: McCraw-Hill, 1965.
J.S. Bain, Industrial orgnization (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley, 1968.

[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
[63]

[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70]
[71]

Scherer, F.M. industrial market structure and economic performance.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970.
T. C. Schelling, The strategy of conﬂict. Cambridge, Mass, 1960.
J. Von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior: 3d Ed. Princeton University Press, 1953.
M. E. Porter, “The contributions of industrial organization to strategic
management,” Academy of management review, vol. 6, no.4, pp. 609620, 1981.
F. W. Gluck, S. P. Kaufman, A. S. Walleck, “Strategic management
for competitive advantage,” Harvard Business Review. vol. 58, no.4,
pp. 154-161, 1980.
J. A. Schumpeter, The theory oí economic development. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.
J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York:
Harpers, 1942.
R. Nelson, “Goldschimd, Mann, and Weston's industrial concentration:
The new learning,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 7, pp. 729-732,
1976.
M. T. Hannan, J. Freeman, “The Population Ecology of
Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 82, no.5, pp.
929–964, 1977.
R. R. Nelson, “Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?,” Strategic
management journal, vol. 12, no.S2, pp. 61-74, 1991.
J. S. Bain, “Barriers to new competition,” Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, Vol. 3, p. 55, 1956.
G. Hamel, C. K. Prahalad, “To Revitalize Corporate Performance, We
Need a Whole New Model of Strategy,” Strategic intent, Harvard
Business Review, vol. 67, no.3, pp. 63–76, 1989.
J. McGee, H. Thomas, “Strategic groups: Theory, research and
taxonomy,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 7, no.2, pp. 141–160,
1986.
P. Ghemawat, Games Businesses Play: Cases and Models, New York
NY: Wiley, 1995.
A. M. Brandenburger, B. J. Nalebuff, Co-Opetition (1 edition). New
York: Currency Doubleday, 1997.
G. J. Mailath, L. Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: LongRun Relationships, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
A. M. Knott, “Persistent Heterogeneity and Sustainable Innovation,”
Strategic Management Journal, vol. 24, pp. 687–705, 2003.
J. Barney, “Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage,”
Journal of Management, vol. 17, no.1, pp. 99–120, 1991.
K. M. Eisenhardt, J. A. Martin, “Dynamic Capabilities: What Are
They?,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 21, no.10/11, pp. 1105–
1121, 2000.
S. A. Lippman, R. P. Rumelt, “Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of
Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition,” The Bell
Journal of Economics, vol. 13, no.2, pp. 418–438, 1982.
R. P. Rumelt, Towards a strategic theory of the firm. In Lamb, R.B.
(Ed.), Competitive Strategic Management. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1984.
K. R. Conner, “A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory
and Five Schools of Thought Within Industrial Organization
Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?,” Journal of
Management, vol. 17, no.1, pp. 121–154, 1991.
B. Wernerfelt, C. A. Montgomery, 'Tobin's q and the importance of
focus in firm performance,” American Economic Review, vol. 78, pp.
246-250, 1988.
R. P. Rumelt, “Theory, strategy and entrepreneurship. In D. Teece
(ed.),” The Competitive challenge, Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 137-58,
1987.
R. E. Caves, M. Porter, “From entry barriers to mobility barriers:
Conjectural decisions and contrived deterrence to new competition,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 91, pp. 241-262, 1977.
P. Ghemawat, “Sustainable advantage,” Harvard Business Review,
pp. 53-58, Sept-Oct 1986.
B. Wernerfelt, “From critical resources to corporate strategy,” Journal
of General Management, vol. 14, pp. 4-12, 1989.
G. Dosi, R. R. Nelson, S. G. Winter, The Nature and Dynamics of
Organizational Capabilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
R. Makadok, “Toward a Synthesis of the Resource-Based and
Dynamic-Capability Views of Rent Creation,” Strategic Management
Journal, vol. 22, pp. 387–401, 2001.
S. G. Winter, “Understanding dynamic capabilities,” Strategic
Management Journal, vol. 24, no.10, pp. 991–995, 2003.

[72]
[73]
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
[86]

[87]
[88]
[89]

[90]

R. A. D’aveni, Hypercompetition (1 edition). New York : Toronto :
New York: Free Press, 1994.
R. A. D’Aveni, “Coping with hypercompetition: Utilizing the new
7S’s framework,” The Academy of Management Executive, vol. 9,
no.3, pp. 45–57, 1995.
L. J. Bourgeois, K. M. Eisenhardt, “Strategic Decision Processes in
High Velocity Environments: Four Cases in the Microcomputer
Industry,” Management Science, vol. 34, no.7, pp. 816–835, 1998.
S. L. Brown, K. M. Eisenhardt, Competing on the Edge : Strategy as
Structured Chaos (1St Edition edition). Boston, Mass: Harvard
Business Review Press, 1998.
J. W. Rivkin, “Imitation of Complex Strategies,” Management
Science, vol. 46, no.6, pp. 824–44, 2000.
L. Mises, Human action: A treatise on economics. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1949.
R. Jacobson, “The Austrian School of Strategy,” Academy of
Management Review, vol. 17, no.4, pp. 782–807, 1992.
G. Young, K. G. Smith, C. M. Grimm, “Austrian and Industrial
Organization Perspectives on Firm-level Competitive Activity and
Performance,” Organization Science, vol. 7, no.3, pp. 243–254, 1996.
M. J. Chen, “Competitive dynamics research: An insider’s odyssey,”
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, vol. 26, no.1, pp. 5–25, 2009.
R. A. D’Aveni, G. B. Dagnino, K. G. Smith, “The age of temporary
advantage,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 31, no.13, pp. 1371–
1385, 2010.
J. A. C. Baum, H. J. Korn, “Competitive Dynamics Of Interfirm
Rivalry,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 39, no.2, pp. 255–
291, 1996.
K. G. Smith, C. M. Grimm, M. J. Gannon, Dynamics of competitive
strategy. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992.
D. J. Ketchen, C. C. Snow, V. L. Hoover, “Research on Competitive
Dynamics: Recent Accomplishments and Future Challenges,” Journal
of Management, vol. 30, no.6, pp. 779–804, 2004.
K. G. Smith, W. J. Ferrier, H. Ndofor, Competitive dynamics research:
Critique and future directions. In The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic
Management, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, pp. 314–361, 2001.
I. C. MacMillan, M. L. McCaffery, G. Van Wijk, “Competitor's
responses to easily imitated new products: Exploring commercial
banking product introductions,” Strategic Management Journal, vol. 6,
pp. 75-86, 1985.
R. A. Bettis, D. Weeks, “Financial returns and strategic interaction:
The case of instant photography,” Strategic Management Journal, vol.
8, no.6, pp. 549–563, 1987.
M. J. Chen, D. Miller, “Competitive Dynamics: Themes, Trends, and a
Prospective Research Platform,” The Academy of Management
Annals, vol. 6, no.1, pp. 135–210, 2012.
D. Sirmon, S. Gove, M. Hitt, “Resource management in dyadic
competitive rivalry: The effects of resource bundling and
deployment,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 51, pp. 919-935,
2008.
H. A. Ndofor, D. G. Sirmon, X. He, “Firm resources, competitive
actions and performance: Investigating a mediated model with
evidence from the in-vitro diagnostics industry,” Strategic Management
Journal, vol. 32, pp. 640-657, 2011.

[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
[101]
[102]

[103]
[104]

[105]
[106]
[107]
[108]
[109]
[110]
[111]
[112]

W. Tsai, K. H. Su, M. J. Chen, Seeing through the eyes of a rival:
Competitor acumen based on rival-centric perceptions. Academy of
Management Journal, forthcoming, 2011.
D. Miller, C. Droge, “Psychological and traditional predictors of
organization structure,” Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 31, pp.
539-560, 1986.
A. C. Hax, D. L. Wilde, The Delta Model -- Toward a Unified
Framework of Strategy (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 344580).
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 2002.
J. B. Rosser, “On the complexities of complex economic dynamics,”
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 13, pp. 169–192, 1999.
W. B. Arthur, Complexity and the Economy (1 edition). Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
E. D. Beinhocker, The origin of wealth: Evolution, complexity, and
the radical remaking of economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Business School Press, 2006.
J. M. Epstein, Generative social science: Studies in agent-based
computational modeling. New York: Princeton University Press, 2006.
J. H. Miller, S.E. Page, Complex adaptive systems: An introduction to
computational models of social life. New York: Princeton University
Press, 2006.
A. P. Kirman, Complex economics: Individual and collective
rationality. The Graz Schumpeter Lectures, Routledge, 2011.
D. G. Saari, “Mathematical complexity of simple economics,” Notices
of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 42, pp. 222–230, 1995.
T. C. Schelling, Micromotives and macrobehaviour. New York: W.
W. Norton, 1978.
J. Crutchfield, “Is anything ever new? Considering emergence. In G.
Cowan, D. Pines, & D. Meltzer (Eds.),” Complexity: Metaphors,
models, and reality, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 515–537,
1994.
H. A. Simon, The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1969.
G. Dosi, G. Fagiolo, A. Roventini, “Schumpeter meeting Keynes: A
policy- friendly model of endogenous growth and business cycles,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, vol. 34, no.9, 1748–1767,
2010.
M. Gallegati, D. Delli Gatti, E. Gaffeo, P. Cirillo, S. Desiderio,
Macroeconomics from the bottom-up. Berlin: Springer, 2010.
D. F. Batten, Discovering artificial economics. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2000.
M. Wooldridge, An introduction to multiagent systems. Chichester:
Wiley, 2002.
N. Gilbert and K. G. Troitzsch, Simulation for the social scientist.
Maidenhead: Open Univ. Press, 2011.
G. Nicolis and C. Nicolis, “Foundations of Complex Systems Nonlinear Dynamics, Statistical Physics, Information and Prediction,”
2007.
N. Gilbert and P. Terna, “How to build and use agent-based models in
social science,” Mind & Society, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 57–72, 2000.
B. Mckelvey, “Perspective—Quasi-Natural Organization Science,”
Organization Science, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 351–380, 1997.
B. Mckelvey, “Complexity Theory in Organization Science: Seizing
the Promise or Becoming a Fad?,” Emergence, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 5–32,
1999.

